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Abstract
The intent of this paper is to analyze the structural composition of the European
Monetary Union and its implications for the European Financial Crisis, specifically with
respect to Greece. This analysis will be driven by a trend analysis of several economic
variables from 1999-2010. These variables range from the 4 requirements set under the
Maastricht criteria, competitiveness indicators, and relative European trade balances, to
international investment position. A quantitative and empirical analysis of this data finds
that the Greek crisis was a result of structural issues with the EMU and the Greek
government. The ECB‘s inability to enforce the Maastricht Criteria and independent
fiscal policy, as well as Greece‘s inability to implement efficient fiscal and economic
policy, resulted in growing imbalances within the Euro area, as well as a loss of
competitiveness and irresponsible rise in sovereign debt for Greece. It is inferred that the
EMU was ineffective in achieving its goals of integration; that Greece was not ready to
join the EMU when it did; and therefore Greece as a Member State of the EMU was
destined to fail.

6

1. Introduction
The Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union had been a long time
goal for the European area. Through the Copenhagen criteria and the Treaty of
Maastricht, several conditions were set for the creation of the European Union (EU) and
later the single European currency, the euro. The Maastricht Treaty specifically outlined
convergence criteria for the third stage of integration, or the monetary union. These
criteria included restrictions on a given country‘s inflation rate, annual government
deficits, and government debt, exchange rate, and long term interest rates.1 Despite these
―strict‖ criteria only a little over a decade after the EMU of seventeen Member States was
formed, two of its Member States have suffered large economic crises, and several others
are on the verge of doing the same. A member since January of 2001, Greece was the
first of these countries to spiral into an economic downturn and is currently on the verge
of defaulting on its sovereign debt.
If the European states created guidelines that promoted the stability and growth of
the euro and prevented its disintegration, how and why is the Greek economy faltering?
Were the mechanisms set in place to monitor EMU members by the European
Commission (EC), the Economic Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN), and the European
Central Bank (ECB) effective? If they were, should there have been additional criteria to
more fully monitor the health of member economies, including trade balance,
1

Panos Afxentiou, "Convergence, the Maastricht Criteria, and Their Benefits," Economia
Internazionale / International Economics 53.4 (2000): 437-48. Camera Di Commercio Di Genova, Web, 18
Nov. 2011,
<http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ353/tesfatsion/MaastrichtConvergenceCriteria.Afxentiou.pdf>,
p.249.
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competitiveness indicators, and/or financial data? If the monitoring mechanism is a
failure, can Greece truly be at complete fault for its situation, or is the EU also at fault?
In order to answer these questions, this thesis will analyze data since the creation
of the EMU to the present. These data will include figures for the Maastricht Criteria, as
well as information on factors mentioned above: relative European trade balances,
productivity and competiveness indicators, and investment position over the 10-year
period since the EMU‘s creation. These data will be taken from institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the ECB, and Eurostat. Mapping out these data over
the 12-year period, will provide markers to establish points at which someone or some
entity should have questioned Greece‘s stability, and in which various policies or lack
thereof served to ameliorate or worsen the economic situation. This includes policy at
the national level, by the Greek government, and the supra-national level, by the
European Central Bank which is in charge of monetary policy for the EMU.
The issue of responsibility will be addressed through any failures in policy that
are found. As well as how the leading European countries followed the Treaty criteria
themselves. Questions will arise, such as Greece‘s entrance in the first place. Was it
ready to join when it did? Was the monetary unification process rushed if appropriate
safeguards were not set in place? For instance, were the Maastricht criteria sufficient
indicators of stability considering other European countries did not follow them but are
doing well? What institutions and policies must be implemented in order to restore
stability to the Euro?
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Going forward these will be pertinent questions to answer as the Euro area
continues to struggle with repairing the EMU and keeping Greece and other members
like Ireland and Portugal afloat. Finding what went wrong will potentially provide a
guideline for updating the EMU structure, and promote its future stability.

2. Background
The idea for a single currency area began in the 1900‘s in the wake of ―Black
Friday,‖ the 1929 New York Stock Exchange crash. This crash created an economic
crisis that reverberated around the world that was only magnified with the use of ―beggarmy-neighbor‖ policies, deflationary monetary policies, and tariff barriers. 2 Such tactics,
which only served to worsen the economic strength and competitiveness of a country,
made countries desire a stable economy.
As the Second World War continued to devastate Europe, international financial,
economic, and monetary matters became increasingly important issues to address for life
after war. On July 22, 1944, over forty countries signed the Bretton Woods Agreement,
which created the rules and procedures that would govern the world economy. Bretton
Woods led to the creation of what is now known as the World Bank and the IMF. 3 In
1945, The United Nations was created and in 1957, the Treaty of Rome (Treaty) was
signed by several European countries to establish the European Economic Community
(EEC). After two destructive wars, the world had become aware of the importance in

2

"Towards a Single Currency: a Brief History of EMU," EUROPA – EU Website, Web, 8 Nov.
2011,
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/introducing_euro_practical_aspe
cts/l25007_en.htm>, p. 1.
3
Towards a Single 1.
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increasing cooperation between countries; cooperation that could prevent further
suffering. 4 It is this need to maintain order and stability that makes the issue of
integration amongst the European countries so important. Europe no longer wanted to be
divided and frail. In a new economic order, they wished to be a cohesive thriving region
that rivaled the United States.
By the end of the 1960‘s the Bretton Woods System seemed to be weakening, and
the turbulent markets were disrupting the stability of European currencies. To address
these new problems in 1969, the Barre report was published. It proposed more
coordination of economic policies and greater monetary cooperation.5 This report gave
momentum to the promotion and creation of a single currency area. A 1969 summit at
The Hague determined the future of Europe when the heads of state chose to create an
economic and monetary union, which had been an explicit goal of European Integration.6
The following year, the Werner report described the three stages that could lead to a
European Monetary Union (EMU) over a period of 10 years. 7
In 1979, the European Monetary System (EMS) was created, bringing monetary
unification one-step closer. This system was based on fixed, but adjustable exchange
rates. Over the following 10 years the EMS and strong political resolve to achieve
economic convergence, did much towards reducing exchange-rate variability. 8 In 1985, a
single market was created amongst the European States, and in 1988, a second three stage
4

Toward a Single1-2.
Toward a Single 2.
6
Toward a Single 2.
7
Burak Gündogdu, and Orkun Girban, "Greece's Integration to EMU and Lessons for Turkey,"
Web, 8 Nov. 2011, <http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/iletisimgm/B_Gundogdu-O_Girban.pdf>, 1.
5
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plan emerged, the Delors report, to re-emphasize the ultimate goal of a strong and stable
EMU.9 To achieve this goal, Member States would have to reinforce the coordination of
their economic policies, meet a set of macroeconomic criteria to unite their economies,
and relinquish monetary policy decision to an independent and newly created European
Central Bank (ECB).10 Two years later the EMU became a reality with the Treaty of the
European Union. This treaty contained the specifics of the stages of integration, and
most importantly a list of economic convergence criteria, known as the Maastricht
Criteria. 11
In the first stage Member States began to improve the free movement of capital
and central bank debts. In the second stage, which began in 1994, Member States began
to be supervised by the Commission on their public financing, and the base for the ECB
was formed to advise states about their independence as central banks and a single
currency. In order to move on to the third and final stage of integration, which was
planned to start in 1997 or 1999 and would mark the beginning of the EMU, Member
States were to meet the Maastricht Criteria. 12
These criteria consisted of several factors, the first of which was the achievement
of a high degree of price stability. This would be apparent with a rate of inflation that
does not exceed the price stability of the three best performing states by 1.5% points13.
The second is the Excessive Deficit Procedure in which the sustainability of the
9

Gündogdu 2.
Gündogdu 2.
11
Gündogdu 2.
12
Gündogdu 2.
13
European Central Bank, Convergence Report, May 2010, Web, 18 Nov. 2011,
<http://www.ecb.europa.eu>, 9-10.
10
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government financial position is determined. The requirements are to have a ratio of
planned or actual government deficit to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 3% or less,
and a ratio of government debt-to-GDP not exceeding 60%.14 The third criterion referred
to exchange rate stability, governments had to participate in the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) for two years without devaluing against the currency of another
Member State. Exchange rate stability was given a band under which the rate could
fluctuate. This band has ranged from +/- 2.25% to +/- 15% in the history of the ERM.15
The fourth criterion stated that a Member State must have an average nominal long-term
interest rate no greater than 2 percentage points above that of the three best performing,
in terms of price stability, Member States.16
By 1999, the third stage of integration was ready to be put in place with 11 EU
Member States ready to join; including Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Despite its attempts,
Greece was unable to join the first Euro area group due to its failure to meet the criteria.
Greece was experiencing severe political unrest and economic failure at the time the
Delors report was published. The Greek Drachma was also not a part of the EMS and
was not perceived to be ready; their failure posed a problem for any deeper integration of
the EU.17 Greece did not wish to be excluded from the benefits a possible EMU could
bring. Over the course of 10 years, since the start of the first stage of integration to the
third, the Greek government and Central Bank of Greece implemented hard monetary and

14

European Central Bank 11-12.
European Central Bank 13-14.
16
European Central Bank 15.
17
Gündogdu 2.
15

12

fiscal policies to fulfill the convergence criteria. It was not until June of 2000 that the
European Council decided that Greece fulfilled the necessary criteria for entrance into the
single currency area, and in January of 2001, Greece entered the Euro area.18 A year
later, Euro coins and banknotes were introduced into the market.
Greece‘s entry into the EMU differed slightly from the 11 original members. It
did not meet the criteria by the 1999 deadline, so in March of 2000, they submitted a new
request to be re-examined. The ECB and the EC each examined the extent to which
Greece had fulfilled the convergence criteria. They found that Greece‘s average rate of
inflation was at 2%, which was lower than the reference value of 2.4%. The government
deficit had fallen below the reference value of 3% in 1999, to 1.6%. While government
debt stood at 104.4%, which was still above the 60% requirement. However, the ECB
and the EC conceded on this point because this value had dropped 6.0 percent since 1996.
Greece was participant of the ERM for at least two years. Lastly, Greece‘s nominal longterm interest rate was 6.4% which was also below the reference value. Despite the debtto-GDP ratio Greece was granted admittance into the EMU.19
In its early years, the EMU proved to be a successful endeavor for the 12 original
Member States. The positive effect can be seen in increased competition and
transparency, a reduction in the volatility of exchange rates, and improved price stability.
These three factors have indirectly affected output growth by reducing investment costs

18

Gündogdu 3.
"Assessment of Greece's Convergence Prior to Its Participation in the Euro Area on 1 January
2001," Banque De France, Dec. 2006, Web, 26 Nov. 2011, <http://www.banquefrance.fr/gb/eurosys/telechar/europe/04_411EXAMEN_ENTREE_GRECE-GB.pdf >, 1.
19
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and encouraging inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the region. 20 Several
reports found that monetary unions increased trade and by 2005, it was suggested that a
15% effect could be measured. 21 At the time, it seems the Euro area contributed to an
increase in cross-border trade in finance, goods, and services, or efficiency gains from
this market integration.22 In terms of financial integration, the Euro area bond market
was quick to adjust after the adoption of the single currency. Yield differentials across
Member States fell sharply, the amount of private bond issues grew, and in general, the
market structure converged to a common area-wide system.23 This factor is significant
because it confirms that investors regarded the bonds issued by each Member State as
extremely close substitutes.
The goal of the EMU was to create a deeper level of integration in the EU.
Therefore the convergence of economic variables amongst Member States is a positive
and desired outcome of the formation of the EMU. Whereas a divergence of economic
variables would signify failure o fully integrate member State economies into a single
Euro area economy.
Apart from the positive economic benefits, an EC Eurobarometer survey suggested
that the EMU held a good level of popular support, and that a majority of the Euro area

20

Ray Barrell, Sylvia Gottschalk, Dawn Holland, and Olga Pomerantz, The Impact of EMU on
Growth and Employment, 318th ed. Economic Papers, Brussels: European Commission, DirectorateGeneral for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2008, European Commission Economic and Financial Affairs,
Apr. 2008, Web, 18 Nov. 2011, 2.
21
Charles Wyplosz, European Monetary Union: The Dark Sides of a Major Success, Economic
Policy, Vol. 21, No. 46, pp. 207-261, April 2006, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=895196 or
doi:10.1111/j.1468-0327.2006.00158, 213.
22
Philip R. Lane, The Real Effects of EMU, IIIS Discussion Paper Series, London: Centre for
Economic Policy Research, 2006, Ser. 115. The Institute for International Integration Studies, 5 Apr. 2006.
Web, 18 Nov. 2011, 4.
23
Lane 6.
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population believed the introduction of the euro was beneficial. The EMU made 19% of
its population ―feel more European.‖ It is in these measures that we can see the political
motivations for integration are being realized in the early years of the EMU.24
Joining the EMU had particular positive effects for Greece. Greece experienced
its highest growth rates since 1999; although this growth cannot be attributed to the EMU
alone, we can attribute the EMU with a strong contribution to this growth.25

The most

important benefit that membership brought to Greece was the increase in credibility.
This credibility brought with it a greater volume of trade and FDI, because as interest
rates decreased, and an implied decrease in risk, borrowing from the Euro area and
international sources became easier.26 The backing of the ECB allowed poorer member
countries like Greece to run extremely large current account deficits. Before the
formation of the EMU investors required such countries to have a larger country risk
premium to fund large deficits. 27
Despite what seemed like a success, there still existed issues that needed to be
addressed. Since the first talks of a single currency region, experts, economists, and
policy makers doubted the sustainability of such a region. Since integration was partially
or mostly based on political considerations, a monetary integration seemed unfeasible
with some of the poorer EU members. Before integration, research showed homogeneity
amongst Germany, France, and the Benelux countries, while the EU-12 showed a

24

Lane 17.
Gündogdu 5.
26
Gündogdu 5.
27
Lane 8.
25
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significantly lower level of homogeneity. 28 Hopes were that this would be remedied once
the single currency had been implemented, but as it turned out most of the convergence
of economies occurred before the EMU began, when countries were attempting to meet
the requirements for entrance. Once the euro was in play, many countries lost the desire
to continue stringent fiscal policies. A report by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) showed that there was a slowdown in the reform
process in EMU member States after the introduction of the euro.29
Another policy that was implemented to promote convergence was the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP), an extension to the Maastricht Criteria. It said that the same
rules set by Maastricht should apply once the Euro was in circulation. Once the Euro was
launched many countries had trouble meeting the strict 3% deficit and 60% debt
requirements.

If a Member State broke the rules for three consecutive years, the EC

could enact penalties, in the form of fines up to 0.5% of GDP, and order the culpable
country to implement correctional mechanisms. 30 In March of 2005, the SGP was
reformed to allow countries more flexibility, it created exceptions to what counted as
spending considered debt. Exceptions included education spending, research, defense,
aid, and the unification of Europe.31 However the SGP lost credibility and remains so
because the adjustment time given to these countries to fix their fiscal policy, about three

28

David McKay. "The Political Sustainability of European Monetary Union," British Journal of
Political Science 29.3 (1999): pp. 463-485, Web, 465-466.
29
Barrell 26.
30
"EU Facts: Stability and Growth Pact," CIVITAS: the Institute for the Study of Civil Society, 21
July 2011, Web, 27 Nov. 2011, <http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSECON/EC10.htm>, 1.
31
EU Facts 1.
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years, was may be excessive 32 This loosening of the restrictions did not help the
convergence of fiscal and economic policies in the Euro area, instead it actually
prevented it.33
What seemed to be a flourishing economic area, with a few recognizable faults,
became the struggling EMU that we see today. Many of the benefits of the EMU became
a source of their troubles. The benefits, economic growth, coupled with fiscal
indiscipline by several of the Member States caused increased imbalances within the
Euro area. These problems in the context of the United States financial crisis in 2008
resulted in Europe‘s own crisis.
Following the 2007 euro area money markets freeze, and not being spared from
the 2008 fall of Lehman Brothers, caused the Euro area to experience a recession for the
first time since its creation. In October of 2009, the Greek public elected a new
government headed by George Papandreou. As soon as the new government was in place,
it admitted that the previous government had been falsifying national accounts for years
and that the actual deficit was at about 13.6% and debt stood at 300bn Euros, 113% of
GDP.34 These figures prompted worries about the probability of a default on Greek debt,
whether Greece would have to leave the Euro area, the possibility of contagion to other
Euro area members, and the future of the EMU. Most people wondered why a seemingly

32

Guillaume R. Sarrat De Tramezaigues, "Assessing the 2005 Growth and Stability Pact Reform:
A New Fiscal Policy Rule for the Euro Zone Is Required," International Journal of Economics and
Finance 2.5 (2010): 140-50, International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science
and Education, Nov. 2010,Web, <http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ijef/article/view/7972>, 141.
33
Sarrat 147.
34
"Europe's Sovereign-debt Crisis: Acropolis Now," The Economist, 29 Apr. 2010, Web. 24 Nov.
2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/16009099>, 1. "Timeline: The Unfolding Eurozone Crisis," BBC
News, 27 Oct. 2011, Web, 20 Nov. 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13856580>, 1.
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successful monetary union could have turned around so quickly. Many had not been
aware of the growing spending, debt, and productivity imbalances amongst the Member
States.
The crisis worsened in 2010. The Greek government began implementing drastic
fiscal austerity policies to curb some deficit, as well as underwent a credit rating
downgrade to below investment grade.35 The yield on Greek bonds grew sharply; interest
rates on ten-year bonds rose to 7.1%, which is the highest rate since the formation of the
EMU and 4 percentage points higher than German bonds. 36 This began to spread to other
countries like Ireland, and Spain; thus answering the question of whether or not the crisis
would be unique to Greece or if it would cause a domino effect. As this problem grew, a
need for a Greek bailout became more prominent, but issues of responsibility and
whether or not the ECB, and other member countries like Germany, were allowed to
bailout the failing state arose. Despite these questions in May of 2010 the IMF and
Eurozone members agreed on a110bn-euro bailout package to help Greece. 37
In 2011 the situation remains grave. Greece is still struggling with increasing
deficit, debt, and interest rates, as well as the continuous enactment of new austerity
measures. As of November of 2010, Greece has installed a new prime minister intent on
tackling the debt crisis, economist and former vice president of the ECB, Lucas

35

"TIMELINE-Euro Zone Debt Crisis," Reuters.com, 14 June 2010, Web. 20 Nov. 2011,
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/14/eurozone-crisis-events-idUSLDE65D0LR20100614>, 1.
36
"Greece's Sovereign-debt Crunch: A Very European Crisis." The Economist. 4 Feb. 2010. Web.
20 Nov. 2011. <http://www.economist.com/node/15452594>.
37
BBC Timeline 1.
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Papademos.38 The crisis is starting to hit not only historically weaker governments, but
others like Austria and France. As the Greek sovereign debt crisis has become a definite
Euro area problem, it is important to understand what went wrong, who the key players
were, and if the euro can regain stability.

3. Literature Review
As this issue is very current, there is a wide array of news and opinion articles that
are circulating. These articles are attempting to make sense of the financial crisis that
many had not conceived of. Many never believed this crisis would take place a mere 10
years after the formation of the euro zone and the common currency. In the past year,
literature pertaining to the Greek financial crisis has examined the flaws in design of the
EMU. A variety of explanations have been given as to the nature of these design flaws,
and different solutions have been presented in order to re-stabilize the EMU and its
monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policies.
An article by Wihlborg, Willett, and Zhang (2010) examines the crisis in Greece
and other euro zone countries as a result of not only fiscal issues, but of current account
deficits, and an inability to develop proper internal adjustment mechanisms. They
present data showing that instead of price and cost convergence within the euro zone, the
opposite occurred. In fact, instead of deficit countries adopting adjustment to their fiscal
policies, it was the surplus countries that carried out the adjustments that kept these
surplus countries in good standing and the deficit countries in the crises they face today.
38

Suzane Daley, "Economist Named to Lead Greek Unity Government," New York Times, 10
Nov. 2011, Web, 12 Nov. 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/11/world/europe/greek-leadersresume-talks-on-interim-government.html>, 1.
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In the late 1990‘s, the creation of the euro was primarily motivated by political
interests. It was an effort by several EU members to move Europe into the third phase of
regional integration. Many at the time believed that the EU members were too many and
did not meet the criteria of what was termed the theory of optimal currency areas. One of
the most important of these criteria was that member countries should have the flexibility
in factor mobility, and price and wage flexibility in order to allow economic adjustments
without causing recessions in the absence of the ability to change exchange rates.39 The
EU‘s solution to pushing forward further integration was that by induction into the
currency area those countries, whose economic policies and status were less than desired,
would fix their policies to create the flexibility needed within and among the euro zone
countries. However, increased flexibility in labor markets and better coordination of
fiscal policies, which were also necessary to maintain the currency area, did not follow its
formation and the euro zone members failed to consider political economic forces that
could oppose such changes. The problem was that once entry was granted, many of the
innovative fiscal policies ceased to occur, pressure to reform no longer existed. 40
One of the largest failures of the EMU was that countries were often treated as
one entity, which was not the case. Even though these countries formed one currency
area, fiscal policies remained largely at the control of the individual countries, and it was
in this distinction that the current issues arose. 41 Financial markets failed to see some of
the early warning signs of some of the Euro area countries‘ deteriorating financial
39

Clas Wihlborg, Willett, Thomas D and Zhang, Nan, The Euro Crisis: It Isn't Just Fiscal and it
Doesn't Just Involve Greece (September 8, 2010), Claremont McKenna College Robert Day School of
Economics and Finance Research Paper No. 2011-03, Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1776133, 4.
40
Wihlborg 5.
41
Wihlborg 6.
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positions, such as the extent of the mounting debt and their inability to repay this debt
because of decreased competitiveness. 42 Wihlborg et al. (2010) comments that in the
case of the Euro, there was a tendency towards excessive optimism and obliviousness in
the early periods; financial excesses were made worse by a lack of differentiation among
Euro area members in pricing Euro area debt. The current crisis seems to support the
view that a single currency union without a political or at least a fiscal union is doomed
to fail; therefore the EMU is at a point where it must either be abandoned or must be
made stronger.43
To illustrate the divergence amongst the Euro area countries, only considering the
12 countries that entered from 1999 to 2001, Wihlborg et al. executed an analysis of
several factors. These included annual data of price and cost indices, such as consumer
price index (CPI), Producer Price Index (PPI), Unit Labor Costs (ULC), and price
convergence indicators.44 They also examined a labor productivity index, and most
importantly the REER 12. The REER 12 is the real effective exchange rate for each
country based on the trade weights within the 12 country euro group. This variable
analyzes the movements of competitiveness within the Euro area. Lastly, they include
the current account balance as a percent of GDP for each Euro area country. 45
After completing this analysis they found, as they believed, little economic
convergence amongst the countries. The currency area created unfavorable
competitiveness between the more stable countries and the deficit countries. Inflation
42

Wihlborg 6.
Wihlborg 9.
44
Wihlborg 13.
45
Wihlborg 14.
43
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rates, ULC based REER-12, price convergence indicators, and ULC showed a divergence
from the average, which means a lack of internal balance adjustments within the Euro
area.46 PPI showed a slight, but not significant convergence to the mean. Whereas CPI
based REER12 and labor productivity showed reversion to the average for the time
period studied.47 The current account balance suggests that intra Euro area adjustment
mechanisms did not work effectively to control divergences in competitiveness.
Countries like Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands show increasing surpluses over the
years, while Greece, Portugal, and Spain suffer from continuous negative balances. 48
From this analysis, several conclusions are derived to analyze the current state of
affairs in the Euro area. Greece is surely responsible for their lack of fiscal discipline and
tendency to conceal the true state of their debt crisis. However, part of the blame can be
placed on other EMU members, like Germany and France. These countries took the need
for internal adjustments seriously, while not exerting any pressure on the weaker
countries to do so. As the years progressed the stronger economies became stronger and
the weaker economies weaker.49 The government debt crisis in the Euro area has
prompted a desire for increased fiscal coordination within the Euro area, and a stronger
enforcement of the deficit and debt limits placed by the Maastricht Criteria. In essence, a
stronger emphasis on continuously meeting the conditions to enter and remain in the
monetary union must exist in order for the union to remain. 50

46

Wihlborg 15-16, 18-19.
Wihlborg 17-18.
48
Wihlborg 20.
49
Wihlborg 21-22.
50
Wihlborg 23.
47
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Wihlborg et al. (2010) suggests that the creation of a ―European Debt
Surveillance Authority‖ would be beneficial in that it could establish benchmarks for debt
for each individual country in the Euro area. Bond markets and financial markets would
demand a risk premium associated with said benchmark and a perception of that specific
government‘s ability to service its debt. In an effort to reach higher benchmarks, the
existing marks would incentivize individual countries to reform and enhance their labor
market flexibility and competitiveness levels. This proposal for a surveillance authority
stems from the recognition that the Greek crisis is not just a fiscal matter, and is not a
problem unique to, or whose blame lies on just, Greece. 51
Another recent paper by Maurer (2010) presents data to support the view that the
EMU debt crisis, or Eurozone debt crisis, is not due solely to fiscal indiscipline and
speculative attacks by financial markets but to internal imbalances between Eurozone
members due to a design fault of the EMU.
A look at the government debt-to-GDP ratio of the Eurozone countries currently
suffering from increased risk premiums on their sovereign debt, Greece, Portugal,
Ireland, and Spain, shows that on average, this ratio was decreasing slightly until 2008
when the subprime crisis affected the world economy. Maurer (2010) suggests that
because of this slight decline, the low real interest rates that these countries took
advantage of at the beginning of the EMU did not cause an increase in government
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borrowing that is called fiscal indiscipline. Rather, it was the private sector that ran up
debt with the abundant amount of cheap credit available to them. 52
A comparison of nominal and real interest rates conducted in this paper showed that
at the start of the EMU, nominal interest rate spread for the 12 original members virtually
disappeared, while the variance coefficient of real interest rate grew because of
significant differences in inflation amongst the Member States.53 The reason for this
difference in nominal and real terms can be explained through the differences in business
cycles. The ECB must choose a uniform nominal interest rate across the Member States,
which results in a divergence in the real interest rates. Low inflation countries (L) will
experience an excess supply of credits, while high inflation countries (H) experience an
excess demand. In a currency union, there is no exchange rate risk, therefore the excess
supply from L is absorbed by the demand from H.54 Firstly, H will begin to accumulate
net debt while L accumulates net wealth. Secondly, if goods and services, and
production factors are not perfectly tradable, mobile, or flexible a ―negative selfreinforcing process is likely to evolve.‖ 55
Maurer (2010) points out that financial markets provide reasonably accurate
measures of a country‘s investment position. However they tend to be slow in processing
information. In this case, they took too much time in realizing the deteriorating
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international debt position of the struggling Eurozone countries. This fact also places
doubts on credit rating agencies, which lack forward-looking abilities.56
Maurer‘s (2010) empirical data suggested that the current account surplus gap had
the strongest implication for interest rates of the Eurozone countries. Based on this
conclusion Maurer (2010) presents several policy options. The first is a policy of fiscal
austerity that will reduce the current account deficit through a decreased government
budget deficit. However, the net effect of this type of policy cannot be determined
beforehand. In a country where private demand is weak, the possibility of a fiscal
austerity policy worsening the current account gap cannot be excluded. 57 Due to this
weak private demand, the article also proposes a second option, a government deficit
spending policy that may decrease the current account gap.58
The third policy option is a default on sovereign debt. At first, the international
net debt position (INDP) of the country would decrease, and by this means so will the
surplus gap. However, if a large portion of the INDP of a country is private debt, the
secondary effect of a default on sovereign debt would be that creditors would demand
higher risk premiums. This increase in the interest rate would once again increase the
gap in surplus. Therefore, a default would have an uncertain effect depending on the
makeup of a country‘s debt. With a large share of private debt, a default on sovereign
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debt must occur with a default on private debt as well, but this might cause bankruptcies
of private debtors.59 Therefore this option may not be suitable either.
A fourth possibility is the depreciation of the euro, which would cause higher net
exports. In the short to medium term, higher net exports increase the primary current
account surplus, raise domestic demand for goods, and increase GDP growth. In the long
term, it might trigger inflation such that creditors will demand higher risk premiums. At
best, this policy option will buy time, and in the meantime will incentivize countries to
expand their domestic export sector.60
Therefore, Maurer (2010) also proposes leaving the monetary union as an option
for the troubled Eurozone members. Leaving would cause a depreciation of the domestic
currency and the benefits described above. Since these countries have high international
debt positions, reintroducing their own currency will worsen their debt problems and
signify a partial default on debt. It will also be difficult for the country to regain
international creditworthiness, and the only way to do so would be to strengthen its
export sector without the help of international investors, which would be difficult to do.61
Nevertheless, leaving the union would be a tragedy for the symbolic value of the EMU,
and given the precarious state of the market this exit might worsen the international
financial system, which was already on its way to recovery before the Eurozone crisis
occurred.62
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Since the EMU is facing several difficult decisions, the important question to
answer is ―what can be done to make the EMU— or its remains — more stable in the
future?‖63 One solution is assigning an instrument to the ECB, such that it is able to
differentiate national interest rates. An instrument capable of doing this would be a
national value added tax for credits determined by the ECB. An ECB dictating some
fiscal policy is unusual, but this is necessary in a currency region that selected countries
for mostly for political reasons rather than economic criteria. In this sense it might be
necessary for a supra-national organization to handle some fiscal regulation along with
monetary policy. 64
The debt crisis emerged out of the strong divergence that existed and exists in
business cycles amongst the member countries, which is responsible for the divergence in
inflation rates, and created the debt-spirals. Maurer (2010) explains that a central bank
determined VAT for credits would guarantee, in spite of any future restrictions of
country-specific fiscal policies, one instrument to fight against country-specific business
cycles. (Maurer, 2010)

4. Methodology
In researching and analyzing the dynamics of the Greek financial debt crisis it
will be important to outline a variety of economic variables over a 12 year period, 19992010. This period includes the 2 years prior to Greece‘s inclusion into the EMU in which
the country attempted to gain membership, and the 10 years since it has been a member.
For most of the variables presented for Greece, a comparison will be done against the
63
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average for the Euro area excluding Greece, or an average of the Euro area as a whole,
and/or another Member State. In order to have complete data for all the countries used,
the member countries that will be used in this analysis of the EMU will be Greece and the
11 original members which include Austria, Belgium, Ireland, France, Luxembourg,
Germany, Italy, Portugal, Finland, Spain, and the Netherlands.
The first economic variables analyzed will be the specific criteria required by the
EMU for membership. These variables consist of a specific range for inflation, budget
deficit as a percent of GDP, national public debt, and long-term interest rates. As these
are the Euro area‘s definitive measures for a stable economy, it is necessary to evaluate
whether or not these criteria were upheld since Greece joined the EMU.
Other variables included in this analysis will include economic growth rates, trade
balance/deficit variables, labor productivity ratios, ULC, and unemployment rates within
the Euro area. The purpose of including these other economic variables is to determine
whether there were other factors that should have been taken into consideration when
constructing the criterion for membership. As the current state of the Euro zone shows,
there were clearly some faults in monitoring the Member States. Those criteria that were
selected were not sufficient indicators of economic stability.
Evaluating these alternate variables will hopefully provide answers for Greece‘s
current crisis. I expect there to be some correlation between Greece‘s deteriorating state
and its relative economic competitiveness level, which is measured through the variables
listed above, as compared to the rest of the Euro area. I expect the trade balance and
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investment position of Greece to be decreasing primarily due to a loss of competiveness
with its Euro Area Member States.

5. Data Description
To obtain the time series data for each of the variables that will be analyzed, I
accessed various statistical databases from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), The
European Central Bank (ECB), Eurostat, and The World Bank. When available, I
selected annual data beginning in 1999 until 2010, which is the latest data reported
without estimates for actual values. If data were only reported on a monthly basis, then I
calculated an average value for the 12 month period. When presenting the Maastricht
criteria variables, I began the data in 1998 to attain a better sense of the effects of
attempting to join and joining the EMU for Greece. Data labeled as EA-11 is an unweighted average of a percentage value of the variable for the 11 original EMU members.
Finally, the data labeled as Maastricht Criteria were either a fixed value set by the EDP or
I calculated based on the data provided by the databases mentioned above.
To evaluate the first of the Maastricht Criteria, I used the CPI Inflation rate,
expressed in annual percentages of average consumer prices on a year-to-year basis. This
variable measures the changes in prices of goods and services, and changes in this rate
will affect the purchasing power of consumers. For the Euro Area, a Harmonized Index
of Consumer Prices (HICP) is used. The HICPs give comparable measures of inflation,
and are the official measure of CPI inflation in the Euro Area for monetary policy and in
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the assessment required under the Maastricht Criteria. 65 Figure 1 shows that from 1998
to 1999 Greece‘s inflation rate dropped significantly, from 4.5 to 2.2 percent, until it met
the criteria and joined the EMU in 2001. After this point Greek inflation was above the
allowed levels and well above the average inflation rate for the EA-11.
To verify whether the criteria to maintain fiscal stability, the EDP, were
maintained, I included the data for government budget deficit to GDP, and gross
government debt to GDP. These two measures are meant to maintain a smooth
functioning of the EMU, and demonstrate a Member State‘s sound public finances.66
Figure 2 demonstrates that once again Greece‘s deficit to GDP decreases in 1999 then
stays close to the criteria of 3% around the time of its entrance to the EMU. Over the
following years Greece quickly increased its budget deficit to a high of 7.4% of GDP
before the financial crisis in 2008 and then to a high of 15.4% during the crisis. On
average the deficit to GDP for the EA-11 states was below the 3% criterion until after the
financial crisis when this value also went above the 3%.
Figure 3 illustrates Greece‘s extremely high levels of government debt to GDP
versus the average of the EA-11 which maintains its debt-to-GDP percentage at the
maximum allowed under the Maastricht Criteria. Pre-2008 the difference between the
EA-11 and Greece is on average about 44%, and post-2008 there is an average difference
of 70%.
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Figure 4 is a depiction of the final criterion, long-term interest rates. Long-term
interest rates are based upon government bond yields or comparable securities, taking
into account the differences in national definition, on the secondary market, gross of tax,
with a residual maturity of ten years. 67 In 1998, prior to the EMU, the differential
between Greece and the EA-11 is approximately 3.7 percentage points. After the
creation of the EMU interest rates converge and stay at virtually equal levels until the
2008 crisis. From 2009 to 2010, Greek interest rates significantly increase from about
5.2% to 9%, while the EA-11 slightly decreases from 4% to 3.7%.
To measure positive economic effects of EMU membership for Greece, I have
included the annual percentage growth rate of GDP. This variable is at market prices
based on the constant local currency. The aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S.
dollars, and the variable is calculated without deductions for depreciation of fabricated
assets or for the depletion and degradation of natural resources. 68 Figure 5 shows that
prior to 2001, the Greek GDP growth was below the EA-11. After it joined the EMU,
Greece had higher GDP growth than the EA-11, on average about 2% higher with a
maximum 4.8 percent difference in 2003. After 2008 however, GDP growth became
negative for the Euro area as a whole, and in 2010 Greek GDP growth continued to be
negative while the EA-11 grew to 1.7%.
To better understand the development of the EMU, several indicators of
competitiveness are included in this analysis. Figure 6 illustrates a measure of labor
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productivity, which is the output that can be produced with a given amount of input of
labor.69 It is measured as an annual index value for person based labor productivity,
which is neither seasonally nor working day adjusted, and is based on the total economy
including the rest of the world (all sectors).70 Over the 12-year period there is a
convergence of the labor productivity index between Greece, and the index for the
changing composition of the Euro area as a whole. From 2006-2009 Greece has higher
productivity on average of about 0.8, but in 2010 Greece‘s value is 3 points below the
Euro area.
Another measure of competitiveness included is an index of ULC. The ECB
website from which this specific data was acquired, defines ULC as total labor costs per
unit of output calculated for the euro area. This is set as a ratio of the total compensation
per employee to GDP at constant prices per person employed. 71 Figure 7 displays annual
data for ULC, neither seasonally nor working day adjusted, derived from the total
economy including the rest of the world. 72 From its entrance into the EMU until about
2006 the index for ULC shows convergence between the Euro area and Greece. After
2006 ULC costs in Greece increase at a greater rate than in the Euro area. In 2009, ULC
in Greece is at about 7 value points above the Euro area.
Figure 8 shows unemployment rates in Greece compared to the average
unemployment rate in the EA-11. Throughout the 12 year period Greece has an
69
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unemployment rate higher than the average for the EA. However, up until 2009 the
Greek unemployment rate and the EA-11 rate show convergence. From 1999 to 2008 the
unemployment rate for Greece fell on average by about 5%.
A common measure of competitiveness is the effective exchange rate index. The
CPI-based real effective exchange rate which is included in this analysis is a measure of
the change in competitiveness of a country. It takes into account the change in prices
relative to other countries. A rise in this index would mean a loss of competitiveness. 73
Figure 9 plots the CPI-REER index for Greece, the Euro Area average, two Member
States that are also undergoing economic problems(Ireland, and Spain), and two Member
States whose economies are stable (Germany, and France). Over the 12 year period there
is convergence of the REER in 2003. After 2006, the graph shows a trend of the low
inflation countries like Germany and France begin to depreciate, while high inflation
countries like Ireland, Spain, and Greece begin to appreciate. In 2010, Greece has value
10 points above the Euro area.
The implication of these competitiveness indicators can be seen in the balance of
payments of a country. The current account of the balance of payments contains
information on the international trade in goods and services. It records credits (exports)
and debits (imports), where a negative balance reflects a current account deficit and
implies a country is a net debtor and a positive balance reflects a surplus and implies a
net creditor.74 Figure 10A shows the current account balance as a percent of GDP for
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Greece and the EA-11. Greece consistently remains at a deficit, on average 10
percentage points below the EA-11. There is a sharp increase of about 8 percentage
points in the current account deficit from 2004 to 2007. Figure 10B depicts the current
account balance in millions of Euros to show the actual values as compared to other
Member States.
To further understand the inner workings of the current account I broke it down
into the trade balance of goods and of services. Figure 11A depicts trade integration of
goods as percent of GDP. This is a measure of average imports and exports of goods
divided by GDP.75 If these indexes increase over time then this means the country or
area is becoming more integrated within the international economy. The Greek and EA11 indexes stay relatively stable; both fluctuate within a 6% band. However the EA-11
trade integration percentage is significantly higher than Greece‘s, about 20 percentage
points more. Figure 11B displays the trade balance of goods in millions of Euros; Greece
is running a deficit in goods.
Figure 12A shows trade integration of services as a percentage of GDP—the same
interpretation that applied to goods applies to this variable as well. The difference
between Greece and the EA-11 is smaller, an average of about 6%. Figure 12B shows
the balance of services in millions of Euros. In the service industry, Greece is running a
trade surplus.
Figure 13 breaks down Greece‘s trade balance within and outside of the EU; as
well as with its trading partners that make up larger than 5% of the trade value. This
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graph demonstrates that over 50% of Greece‘s trade happens within the EU, and its
largest EMU trading partners are Germany and Italy.
The final variable that is analyzed is the International Investment Position (IIP).
The IMF describes the IIP as a statistical statement that show‘s an economy‘s stock of
external financial assets and liabilities at a particular point in time. This is stock is
created from past external transactions measured according to current market prices and
exchange rates at a specific point. It is composed of Direct Investment, Portfolio
Investment, Financial Derivatives, and Other Investment.76 Figure 14A displays IIP as a
percent of GDP. While Greece and the EA-11 share similar IIP values at the beginning
of the period examined, these diverge over the 12 year period to a maximum difference of
97 percentage points in 2010. Figure 14B shows the IIP in millions of national currency,
including ‗euro fixed‘ series for euro area countries.
I conclude the data analysis with a breakdown of the liabilities section of Greece‘s
IIP. Table 1 illustrates the full breakdown, including Direct Investment in the reporting
Economy, Portfolio Investment, Financial Derivatives, and Other Investment. Figure
15A shows the percentage of liabilities by banks and other sectors in Equity Securities of
Portfolio Investment. In this section foreigners are holding a larger portion of portfolio
equity securities in other sectors. Figure 15B illustrates the percentage of liabilities by
banks, government, and other sectors in Bonds and Notes of Portfolio Debt Securities. In
terms of Bonds and Notes, foreigners are holding a huge portion of the government debt
securities as compared to their holdings of banks and other sectors‘ securities. Figure
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15C depicts the percentage of liabilities by government, banks, and other sectors of loans
in other investment. In this section the largest portion of loans being held by foreigners is
in the banks.

6. Empirical Findings
Given the trends in the data presented above, this section will draw inferences on
the implications of these trends for the EMU and Greece. It will analyze what these
trends meant for the EMU since its creation, the implications of these trends on the
current situation, and the lessons we can draw from them for the future.
In the background section of this paper I described a phenomenon of countries
attempting to join the EMU by imposing strict fiscal and monetary policies in order to
meet the requirements for membership, but subsequently, easing up on these stringent
policies once they were granted membership. This phenomenon is quantitatively visible
in several of the graphs presented, particularly in the Maastricht Criteria variables. Not
meeting the criteria presents a problem for the EMU since its stability relies on the
convergence of the economies of Member States.
Greek inflation dropped significantly in 1999, but after it had qualified for
membership in 2001, its inflation rate began to increase once again. Greece‘s high and
increasing inflation rates leads to decreased competiveness since their prices are now
higher, and results in further divergence from the EMU economy as a whole. High
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inflation rates also lend to an excess demand for goods and services, further leading the
high inflation country to accumulate debt. 77
The two measures of fiscal stability, deficit and debt to GDP, also display
Greece‘s significant divergence from both the average of the Euro Area and the criteria
mandated by the EDP. These two variables display a policy failure on both the side of
Greece and the ECOFIN‘s monitoring of the SGP.
The SGP has largely been ineffective in preventing, or maintaining stable fiscal
levels in the Euro area. In 2003, Germany and France, the largest and strongest
economies of the Euro area, broke the EDP rules. They were the first to do so. However,
because of their position they were able to evade any strong action or penalties from the
ECOFIN on a promise to reach the SGP targets soon.78 If, as the Economist wrote, the
SGP ―is a political totem, a symbol that euro-using countries will not cheat each other,‖
than the lack of penalty for some countries and not others was a sign that the SGP was
weak and is the cause of political fallout between the small and large Member States. 79
When Ireland and Portugal broke the EDP penalties were applied more strictly.
They see the unequal penalties as a case of double standards. A lack of penalties is also
frustrating to a country like Austria that is putting forth much greater efforts to abide by
the requirements80 These double standards may have fostered some resentment; which in
turn may explain why so many of the Member States began to break the EDP. They may
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have felt justified in breaking the budgetary requirements if the deficit was broken in the
pursuit of economic growth. These were the justifications given by Germany and France
for reforming the SGP in 2005.81
As described previously, the SGP began with a strict policy for deficit and debt
levels. It was later reformed with much more flexible rules, at the request of Germany
and France. This flexibility, however, makes it difficult to break its regulations.82 The
SGP is not strong enough to control and affect budgetary discipline. It lacks credibility
because of its uneven application of penalties. Ultimately, fiscal policy and statistic
reporting are tasked to the Member States. Therefore, any changes coming from a
supranational entity are difficult to implement without the compliance of the State itself.
This presents the failure on behalf of Greece. While the EMU is unable to
properly coordinate and implement fiscal policy, it is Greece that failed to maintain a
stable budget. While high inflation, higher prices, and an increased demand for goods
required increased government revenues, the opposite occurred. The Greek government
coupled greater spending for social services and goods, with fewer revenue streams due
to their ineffective tax collection system. For example the difference between what
Greek taxpayer‘s owed last year and what was actually paid to the government was a
third of the total tax revenue. This approximately represents the size of its budget
deficit.83
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After the 2009 sovereign debt crisis emerged, records and interviews showed that
Greece had entered into a decade- long endeavor to hide actual levels of debt within the
country. They were able to do so with the help of a deal made with Goldman-Sachs that
hid billions in debt from the EC budget overseers. This deal was treated as a currency
trade rather than a loan, which aided Greece in meeting the requirements, while
continuing to spend beyond their means. 84 Greece has made a string of other similar
deals in which cash was provided in exchange for future government payments. This
deception begs the question of whether Greece should have ever been admitted into the
EMU. As a result of its admittance, it is inferred that Greece‘s entrance was a result of
the strong political motivations to move the EU into a stage of greater integration.
Although the magnitude of the actual numbers was not known, Greece never met
the debt-to-GDP requirements. Despite the fact that even their falsified numbers did not
meet the criteria, Greece was still admitted because they met the other requirements.
Commencing in 2004, Eurostat questioned the reliability of Greek Statistical Data, and
has subsequently needed regular audits of Greek numbers. Each audit found incorrect
data.85 It seems that Eurostat‘s futile attempts to improve methodological reporting in
Greece, was another indicator that Greece was not ready to enter the EMU.
EMU membership allowed the Greek government to set low long-term interest
rates. It allowed them to borrow at lower rates because of its association with the euro.
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Credit was more readily available which complemented the excess demand for goods.
The ease, with which some Member States could attain loans and FDI from many
sources, helped the growth of unsustainable imbalances amongst the Member States. By
showing no differentiation in lending amongst Member States, financial markets
weakened rather than strengthened the permanence of fiscal discipline in states like
Greece.86
These low rates show a failure by investors and those providing loans to Greece,
to properly assess the risk associated with providing loans to the Greek government
specifically versus the EMU. The EMU is a union of monetary policy and with few
ineffective fiscal regulations. It is more of a political union and not a cohesive economic
unit. It was, therefore, necessary for a differentiation amongst Member States. Here too
we can see where there existed a policy failure on behalf of the ECB who dictates
monetary policy. The ECB should have implemented a system of varied interest rates,
based on country specific information on a country‘s ability to repay the loan.
By looking at the breakdown of Greece‘s decreased IIP, we can see the portion of
debt being issued to the Greek government, Greek banks, and other sectors in Greece by
foreigners. The negative IIP is consistent with the amount of debt each of these sectors
was accruing in the form of loans, equity and debt securities. The most important
component of the IIP that can be used to offer a greater understanding of the debt crisis
and possible future ramifications of Greece‘s large debt, is acquiring information on the
countries that are most exposed to Greek debt. Data compiled by the Bank for
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International Settlements shows that France and Germany are most exposed to Greek
debt. Figure 16 is a visual breakdown of the lending exposure between banks and private
lending, and government debt exposure. Of the top eight countries exposed, half of them
belong to the EMU and five out of eight are part of the EU. Because a significant portion
of Greek debt was held by Euro members, we have to wonder why the large amounts of
lending continued, and why these countries were not worried about Greece‘s ability to
repay the loans.
This crisis is not only a story of rampant fiscal deficits and debt, it also a story of
the EMU‘s effect on trade, productivity, growth, and overall competitiveness. For
Greece, membership in the EMU provided a time of seeming prosperity. Growth rates
were high, labor productivity was high, FDI inflows were abundant, and consumption
was high. However, bank of Greece Governor George Provopoulos said ―high growth
rates in the past were mainly fuelled by domestic consumption, which outpaced the
economy‘s production capacity and potential output.‖87 In addition, high growth rates
and productivity were coupled with high ULC rates. ULC in Greece was high because of
the large amounts of social services, benefits and employee compensation. These
benefits create a structural issue in which there is a large disincentive to both hire
workers and seek employment.88 Greece‘s issues with ULC are noted in a speech by
current Greek Prime Minister, and then Vice President of the ECB, Lucas Papademos
that is reproduced in an ECB report published in 2007. In this speech he describes that
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―despite very strong productivity growth, increases in compensation per employee have
resulted in relatively high ULC growth vis-à-vis the euro area average.‖89 He explicitly
says that this should be a reason for concern because persistent ULC growth above the
Euro area average can result in losses to competitiveness, and with adverse effects on the
economy.
These losses in competitiveness can be seen in the large current account deficit
Greece incurred over the 12-year period examined in which the EMU was active.
Greece‘s relative exchange rate was appreciating, and trade integration of goods and
services did not occur. Even with recognition from the ECB, it was a little too late to
implement adjustment mechanisms to alleviate the loss in competitiveness. Overall, it
seemed that EMU was beneficial for the core EMU states, like Germany and France, who
already had a strong economy; while leaving other countries, like Greece, in a worse
condition. Whether or not Greece would have ended up in a similar crisis had it not
entered the EMU can only be left to speculation.

7. Conclusion
The EMU was largely created by European political will for integration, stability,
and economic strength in the global economy. It is for these reasons that the stability of
the EMU is still being fought for today. These symbolic reasons are why the ECB and
IMF refuse to let Greece and other faltering Member States default on their debt.
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The EMU was truly a leap of faith. Little theory existed on the creation of an
optimal currency area. The designers of the EMU created criteria they felt would best
induce a convergence of Member State economies. Ultimately it was the ECB‘s inability
to effectively control fiscal policy and control divergences in competiveness that
hindered monetary integration. For the most part, Member States of the Euro area
maintained relatively diverse economies.
The analysis conducted in this paper, in the context of research done by others,
has illustrated a complicated story behind the current Euro crisis. First of all, the
Maastricht criteria and monitoring organizations demonstrated a policy failure in
enforcing the requirements meant to foster monetary integration. Secondly, the initial
success of the EMU created a symbolic integration of Member States which resulted in
fiscal account imbalances. Countries that normally would be deemed too risky to invest
in, or required higher interest rates like Greece, were treated on par with stronger
economies like Germany. This led to the high levels of sovereign debt in countries that
should have always been considered too fiscally irresponsible to carry such a debt
burden. Thirdly, the EMU caused positive growth rates, and levels of productivity in the
smaller EMU countries. However these factors coupled with governments ill-equipped to
handle this level of growth resulted in high inflation, high current account deficits, and
ultimately a loss in competitiveness as compared to its largest trading partner, the Euro
area.
The current situation in the Euro area looks bleak. In spite of this, the strong
political resolve needed to fix the structural issues within the EMU and within Member
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States exists. In order to regain stability the EMU must learn from the past imbalances
and policy failures. The creation and/or strengthening of a monitoring agency that will
not only implement and regulate the SGP but will also monitor factors of competitiveness
should be considered. Stronger fiscal coordination, and how to ensure there is follow
through within each Member States, should be considered. More research is needed to
analyze the viability of these options, and others not mentioned here.
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Figure 9
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Figure 14A

International Investment Position, Net
20

Percent of GDP

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

-20

1998

0

-40

Greece

-60

EA-11

-80
-100

-120

Source: Eurostat
Figure 14B

International Investment Position, Net

MIllions of National Currency*

1,000,000

Greece

500,000

France
Germany

Ireland

0

Italy
Portugal
-500,000

Spain

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

-1,000,000

Source: Eurostat. *National Currency: including ‗euro fixed‘ series for euro area
countries

57

Table 1: International Investment Position- Standard Components Liabilities90
Concept

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Net Assets (A- L)

-43317.0 -53157.0 -68061.0 -82864.0 -101557.0 -124122.0 -149187.0 -178164.0 -214467.7 -179182.4 -199406.3 -210261.3

Total Liabilities

102195.0 114659.0 135894.0 162956.0 191607.0 226884.0 279281.0 327200.0 404527.1 404337.0 459797.0 441118.0

1. Direct Investment In
Reporting Economy, (L)

15316.0 13412.0 15819.0 14838.0

17778.0

20910.0

24743.0

31350.0

36153.0

27390.0

29222.0

26213.0

1.1 Equity Capital and
Reinvested Earnings, Liabilities 14481.0 12414.0 14884.0 13926.0 17118.0 20131.0 22859.0 29303.0 33731.0 24538.0 27162.0 23088.0
1.2 Other Capital, Liabilities

2. Portfolio Investment
(Excluding Financial
Derivatives), (L)
2.1 Portfolio Investment, Equity
Securities, Liabilities
2.1.1 Banks, Liabilities
2.1.2 Other Sectors, Liabilities
2.2 Portfolio Investment, Debt
Securities, Liabilities
2.2.1 Bonds and Notes,
Liabilities
2.2.1.2 General Government,
Liabilities
2.2.1.3 Banks, Liabilities
2.2.1.4 Other Sectors,
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2.2.2 Money Market
Instruments, Liabilities
2.2.2.2 General Government,
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2.2.2.3 Banks, Liabilities
2.2.2.4 Other Sectors,
Liabilities

3. Financial Derivatives, (L)
4. Other Investment, (L)
4.1 Trade Credits, (L)
4.1.1 General Government,
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4.1.2 Other Sectors, Liabilities
4.2 Loans, (L)
4.2.1 Monetary Authorities,
Liabilities
4.2.2 General Government,
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4.2.3 Banks, Liabilities
4.2.4 Other Sectors, Liabilities
4.3 Currency & Deposits, (L)
4.4 Other Liabilities, (L)
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Figure 15A
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Figure 15B
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Figure 15C
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Figure 16
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Table 2

Country

Total of 24
countries
European
banks
Non-European
banks
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Spain
UK
US

Total
Total lending Government
exposure to
debt
Greece
exposure to
(millions)
Greece
(millions)
145,783

54,196

136,317

52,258

9,466
56,740
33,974
4,085
1,631
974
14,060
7,318

1,938
14,960
22,651
2,345
432
540
3,408
1,505

Source: Bank for International Settlements Quarterly Review 92
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